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Did They Forget to Zero the Scales?: To
Ease Jury Deliberations, the Supreme
Court Cuts Protection for the Mentally Ill
in Clark v. Arizona
Elizabeth Aileen Smitht
Introduction
On June 29, 2006, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
Eric Clark's conviction for first-degree murder in Clark v.
Arizona.1 At age seventeen, Clark fatally shot a police officer
while suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. 2  A trial court
originally convicted Clark and sentenced him to a life term, and
the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction. 3
The Supreme Court held that neither Arizona's insanity test nor
its restriction on the consideration of mental illness and incapacity
evidence on the issue of mens rea violates due process. 4
The decision in Clark v. Arizona violates the Constitution
and should be reversed. Clark directly bears on the future
treatment of mentally-ill offenders within our legal system. This
Article seeks to highlight its flaws and, at the same time, bring
attention to the grander, pre-existing problems created by current
methods of dealing with mental illness in the legal system. The
first Section of this Article traces the incorporation of the mens rea
requirement and the insanity defense into the criminal justice
system, confirming that the principle of punishing only those
individuals who have criminal intent has a substantial history.
This Section includes a special focus on Arizona's unique insanity
test. Next, this Article outlines the Supreme Court's recent
determination that due process does not require an insanity test
that contains a cognitive prong or the admission of expert
t. J.D. expected 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
University of Minnesota. I would like to thank my family and friends for their
unconditional support and constant encouragement, as well as the staff and editors
of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for making this
publication possible.
1. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2737 (2006).
2. Id. at 2716.
3. Id. at 2718.
4. Id. at 2716.
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testimony used to negate mens rea. After detailing the facts in
Clark and the Court's reasoning for its decision, this Article's third
Section critiques the Court's holding and its justification for that
holding by delving into the issue of jury confusion and identifying
future problems which might arise from the Clark decision.
I. Law Prior to Clark: Mens Rea and the Insanity Defense
A. History of the Concept of Mens Rea
A criminal offense usually requires both an actus reus and
mens rea. 5 Actus reus refers to the voluntary act, while mens
rea-literally, a 'guilty mind"'-refers to the mental state of the
perpetrator. 6 The Court has defined mens rea as "the ancient
requirement of a culpable state of mind;"7 however, some scholars
say the phrase defies definition.8 These scholars find the exact
meaning of mens rea to be "notoriously elusive due to its history of
imprecise and ambiguous exposition at the hands of common law
courts, legislators, and commentators alike."9  While many
societies have manipulated the concept to fit into their existing
moral scheme, the term can be understood generally to refer to the
intent behind a criminal act. 10
In early medieval times, the concept of mens rea did not
exist, and evidence that an individual had committed the act in
question might have been sufficient to convict him.'1 Roman,
Hebrew, Greek, and canon law, however, all drew a line between
acts committed intentionally and those committed
unintentionally. 12 While written law in the Anglo-Saxon period
still supported the belief that no mens rea needed to be shown to
impose criminal liability, in reality the absence of a culpable
mental state sometimes led to reduced punishment.13 The Church
of England and universities became the main advocates for
5. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 2001).
6. Id.
7. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
8. E.g. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of
Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 637-38
(1993).
9. Id. at 638 ("[T]he mens rea concept is so riddled with verbal imprecision
that it lacks meaning.").
10. Id. at 634-35.
11. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1215 (2000).
12. Henry T. Miller, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity
Defense, 46 LA. L. REV. 337, 338 (1985).
13. Gardner, supra note 8, at 652-54.
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formally adding a mens rea element to English criminal law. 14
Saint Augustine first used the term mens rea to argue that
behavior cannot be judged without considering mental state. 15 By
the end of the twelfth century, canon law exerted a strong
influence over the formation of criminal law, and "Christian ethics
had long emphasized mental culpability as essential to
sinfulness." 16  In the thirteenth century, most felonies required
criminal intent. 17 Starting in the fifteenth century, courts began
to distinguish between mental states and to designate different
levels of culpability. 18 By the middle of the twentieth century, the
United States legal system began to require that prosecutors prove
the mens rea element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 19
Over hundreds of years, the mens rea requirement became a
central tenet of criminal justice.20 The American legal code by and
large exemplifies the principle that moral culpability justifies
punishment, 21 and "moral blameworthiness require[s] that the
offender make a free, voluntary, and rational choice" to commit the
evil act.22 According to this conception of justice, offenders who
act under mistaken factual beliefs or in self-defense do not merit
the same punishment and should not be treated analogously to
offenders with a morally malevolent intent.23
B. History of the Insanity Defense
1. England Refines an Ancient Concept
While formal incorporation of an insanity defense did not
come until later, history shows the concept of mitigating
responsibility for those suffering from mental illnesses has figured
in legal discourse for several hundred years. The insanity defense
can trace its roots back to biblical times. 24 During the fourteenth
century, the definition of insanity centered on the ability to tell
14. Miller, supra note 12, at 338.
15. Gardner, supra note 8, at 654-55.
16. Id. at 654.
17. Miller, supra note 12, at 339.
18. Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1216.
19. John Gibeaut, A Matter Over MIND: The Supreme Court Is Poised to Review
the Insanity Defense, an Issue That Has Confounded Courts, Psychiatrists, and
Lawyers, 92 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2006, at 32, 37.
20. Gardner, supra note 8, at 655.
21. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 115.
22. Gardner, supra note 8, at 665.
23. Id. at 666.
24. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 37.
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good from evil. 25  By the fifteenth century, English judges
frequently instructed juries on the idea that total deprivation of
the ability to reason could mitigate an individual's criminal
culpability. 26
Standardized jury instructions on the insanity defense
originated with the trial of Daniel M'Naghten in 1843.27
M'Naghten killed Edmund Drummond in an attempt to
assassinate Sir Robert Peel, 28 the British Prime Minister. 29 At
trial, M'Naghten's counsel introduced evidence, including medical
testimony,30 to show M'Naghten suffered from delusions 31 and
thus believed that killing Peel would save his own life. 32 The
judge instructed the jury to determine whether, at the time
M'Naghten committed the act, he "had or had not the use of his
understanding, so as to know that he was doing a wrong or wicked
act." 33 The jury came back with a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity and sent M'Naghten to a criminal lunatic asylum. 34
After M'Naghten, the English House of Lords worked with
judges to establish a standard rule for cases involving the insanity
defense. 35  The resulting test consisted of two prongs.3 6  To
establish a defense of insanity, an individual must show that he 1)
did not know the nature or quality of the act, or 2) did not know
what he was doing was wrong. 37 This second prong refers to an
individual's ability to tell the difference between right and
wrong.38 By the middle of the twentieth century, every state in
the United States except for New Hampshire had established, and
25. Miller, supra note 12, at 339-40.
26. Jenny Williams, Reduction in the Protection for Mentally Ill Criminal
Defendants: Kansas Upholds the Replacement of the M'Naughten Approach with the
Mens Rea Approach, Effectively Eliminating the Insanity Defense [State v. Bethel,
66P.3d 840 (Kan. 2003)], 44 WASHBURN L.J. 213, 235 (2004).
27. Id. at 217.
28. DONALD H.J. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 34 (1983).
29. Williams, supra note 26, at 218.
30. Louis H. COHEN, MURDER, MADNESS AND THE LAW 35 (1952).
31. HERMANN, supra note 28, at 34.
32. Williams, supra note 26, at 218.
33. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), reprinted in
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 932 (6th ed. 1995). This case may also be
properly referred to as "M'Naghten," "M'Naughten," or "M'Naughten's Case."
34. COHEN, supra note 30, at 35.
35. HERMANN, supra note 28, at 35.





put into use, the M'Naghten rule as the test for insanity. 39
2. The States Add a Few New Twists
English courts continue to follow M'Naghten, but other tests
have developed in the United States. 40 In the mid-nineteenth
century, concerns that the M'Naghten test focused exclusively on
cognitive disability led some of the states to use the Irresistible
Impulse test to supplement M'Naghten.41 The Irresistible Impulse
test recognizes volitional impairment. 42 Sometimes described as
the "Policeman at the Elbow" test, this test asks whether the
individual would have committed the act even if a policeman had
been standing by his side because he was so unable to control his
behavior. 43  In 1954, Judge Bazelon and the D.C. Circuit
articulated another volitional test, the Durham test.44  The
Durham test excuses defendants whose unlawful act is the product
of a mental disease or defect and offers the "possibility for an
expansive definition of insanity."45 Finally, the American Legal
Institute created the Model Penal Code ("MPC") test in 1962,
which considers whether, at the time of the act, an individual
lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness
of his behavior or conform to the law. 46
During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. courts saw a dramatic rise
in the use of the insanity defense. 47 This liberal era in American
criminal law emphasized rehabilitation instead of punishment for
mentally-ill offenders. 48 An abrupt shift took place in 1981 when
John Hinckley successfully asserted a defense of insanity for his
attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan. 49  Professor
Michael Perlin of New York Law School argues: "The acquittal of
39. Williams, supra note 26, at 219.
40. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n, "Literature as Law": The History of the Insanity
Plea and a Fictional Application Within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 381, 392 (1999).
41. HERMANN, supra note 28, at 38.
42. Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1211-12.
43. Christine Michalopoulos, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity Defense: The
Andrea Yates Case and the Need for a New Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 383,
394 (2003).
44. Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How
Recent Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1484
(2005).
45. Id.
46. Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 40, at 397.
47. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1483.
48. Id. at 1486.
49. See Williams, supra note 26, at 220-21 (describing the response to the
Hinckley verdict and the resulting enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act).
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John W. Hinckley galvanized the American public in a way that
led directly to the reversal of 150 years of study and
understanding of the complexities of psychological behavior and
the relationship between mental illness and certain violent acts."50
In the three years following the Hinckley scandal, thirty-four
states changed their insanity laws. 51 Demands from the public for
complete abolition of the defense grew, with support from the
Reagan administration.5 2 A shift in priority from the individual
rights of the mentally ill to the safety of the general public caused
the abandonment of rehabilitation goals in favor of punishment. 53
On the federal level, the reaction to Hinckley's successful
defense resulted in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,
which provides: 54
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe
mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 55
This was the first time Congress ever enacted legislation defining
criminal insanity.56 The new federal standard required the
defense to prove insanity by a clear and convincing standard and
the test did not include a volitional prong. 57 With the Act, federal
law returned to the status quo ante when the M'Naghten test stood
as the one and only test for insanity. 58
Senate Reports show the Senate Judiciary Committee sought
to allow admission of behavioral evidence that might be relevant
to challenging the requisite state of mind as one element of the
offense. 59 At the same time, the Senate planned to prevent such
evidence from being used for affirmative defenses, like diminished
capacity. 60 Accordingly, the Act allows the admission of evidence
50. Michael L. Perlin, 'The Borderline Which Separated You from Me The
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1380-81 (1997).
51. Ren6e Melangon, Arizona's Insane Response to Insanity, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
287, 296 (1998).
52. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 37; Perlin, supra note 50, at 1381-82.
53. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1486.
54. Williams, supra note 26, at 221.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
56. Miller, supra note 12, at 349.
57. Williams, supra note 26, at 221.
58. Perlin, supra note 50, at 1382.
59. Judi S. Greenberg, Recent Case, United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d




of mental disease or defect only with the insanity defense and no
other affirmative defenses. 61  Congress specifically intended to
reduce the possible confusion that expert testimony might cause. 62
The Act explicitly prohibits an expert from giving an opinion on
whether the defendant had the required mental state; 63 however,
the lack of other explicit restrictions on expert testimony opens the
door for arguments supporting the admission of other expert
testimony describing the defendant's state of mind. 64 Since its
enactment, circuit courts have read the Act in contradictory ways.
Some have interpreted it to allow the admission of psychiatric
testimony to negate mens rea, while others to forbid psychiatric
testimony outside of the insanity defense. 65
Jurisdictions in the United States currently embrace all of
the insanity standards described in this section. 66 According to a
2002 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law study, twenty-
five states continue to use the M'Naghten test. 67 Seventeen have
adopted the MPC test, while three use the Irresistible Impulse test
and one uses the Durham test.68 The Insanity Defense Reform Act
of 1984 continues to guide the insanity defense in the federal
system.69  Because states use different tests, an individual
meeting the definition of legal insane in one state might not be
considered legally insane in another.
3. Movements Aimed at Abolishing the Insanity
Defense Achieved Limited Success
Four states have eliminated the insanity defense
altogether.70 Proponents of abolition claim that eliminating the
insanity defense will improve the criminal justice system's public
image and the public's perception of the mentally ill by showing
that the system holds the mentally ill accountable for their actions
the same as everyone else. 71 Abolitionists also argue that more
61. Id. at 974.
62. Id. at 976.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 977.
66. See Grachek, supra note 44, at 1485.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Williams, supra note 26, at 220-23.
70. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1485. Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah do not
provide an affirmative insanity defense. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2706, 2721
n.20 (2006).
71. See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 1243-44 (explaining different views that
support the elimination of the insanity defense).
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efficient treatment for the mentally ill will result from eliminating
the defense by pushing defendants to recognize their illness and to
receive proper treatment.72 Additionally, abolitionists point to
statistics that suggest white defendants are disproportionately
found not guilty by reason of insanity because of their race.
73
Also, "the insanity defense can be weighed heavily towards those
who are well-off ' 74 because they can afford to hire a skilled team of
psychiatrists. This inequality combined with the often disgraceful
conditions of public mental hospitals, which may actually inhibit
rehabilitation, presents a compelling case for altering the insanity
defense. 75
Faced with abolition movements using such arguments,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Kansas all passed legislation to
abolish the insanity defense and restrict the admission of
psychiatric evidence on the issue of mens rea. 76 The Kansas
Supreme Court upheld the state statute, finding the insanity
defense was not fundamental. 77  Idaho's Supreme Court also
upheld its state statute. 78 The United States Supreme Court has
yet to decide on the constitutionality of abolishing the insanity
defense. 79
C. Bifurcated Trials
Some jurisdictions have utilized procedural manipulations to
alter the insanity defense. One such procedural alteration is the
bifurcated trial, which originated in Wisconsin in 1878.80 A
bifurcated trial splits a criminal trial into two parts.8 1 Guilt and
insanity receive separate consideration.8 2 Bifurcation is designed
72. Id. at 1245.
73. Jonathan Rowe, Why Liberals Should Hate the Insanity Defense, in TAKING
SIDES 100, 105 (M. Ethan Katsh & Wililiam Rose eds., 2002).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 108-09 (noting that over half of the staff in the country's public
mental hospitals are graduates of foreign medical schools and illustrating this
problem with an anecdote about a staff member who did not know .8 and .80
equaled the same amount of medication).
76. Recent Development, State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990), 104 HARv.
L. REV. 1132, 1132 (1991); Williams, supra note 26, at 213.
77. Williams, supra note 26, at 213-14 (citing State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851
(Kan. 2003)).
78. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 921 (Idaho 1990).
79. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 805 (1985).
80. Verla Seetin Neslund, The Bifurcated Trial: Is It Used More Than It Is
Useful?, 31 EMORY L.J. 441, 445 (1982).




to "prevent evidence on the issue of insanity from prejudicing the
jury during the guilt-innocence determination."8 3 By determining
which evidence applies to which part of the trial, proponents claim
bifurcation can reduce juror confusion.8 4  Never a popular
technique, courts in Arizona, Florida, and Wyoming have held that
state statutes requiring bifurcation during insanity proceedings
are unconstitutional, and the use of bifurcation significantly
decreased in the 1970s. 85  Arizona became the first state to
overturn its statute on due process grounds.86 In State v. Shaw,
the court found bifurcation violated a defendant's right to a fair
trial by creating an "irrebuttable presumption of intent" during
the first stage.8 7 Since then, statutes with bifurcation schemes
"[have] consistently generated due process challenges. 8 8
D. Arizona's Insanity Defense
Arizona's original insanity law closely resembled the
M'Naghten rule.8 9  In response to public outcry surrounding
sensational cases, Arizona has "toughened" the standards of the
insanity defense twice. 90 The first change came in response to two
crimes that occurred in 1981: in the first, a court acquitted by
reason of insanity a man who stabbed his wife while allegedly
sleepwalking; in the second, the defendant shot his wife and her
lover when he found them in bed together. 91 The Arizona Senate
formed a subcommittee to examine the state's insanity law, and in
1983 the legislature shifted the burden of proof to the defendant
and raised the burden to a clear and convincing evidence
standard.92
A second reform resulted from another jury verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity. 93 In this sensationalized case, Mark
Austin, the defendant, bought duct tape and nylon cord before
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 442.
86. Id. at 475-76.
87. State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (Ariz. 1970).
88. Neslund, supra note 80, at 486.
89. Melanqon, supra note 51, at 294 (citing the Arizona Penal Code of 1901,
which states that "[aill persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots nor
lunatics nor affected with insanity" and that "[a]ll persons are capable of
committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: ... (2) idiots, (3)
lunatics and insane persons").
90. Id. at 295.
91. Id. at 296.
92. Id. at 296-97.
93. Id. at 288-89.
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going to the home of his separated wife and fatally stabbing her
and seriously wounding her boyfriend. 94 Austin then slit his own
wrists and throat, but he survived. 95 Despite being committed to a
state mental hospital, the defendant was free after only six
months. 96 Proposals for reform suggested limiting access to the
insanity defense to defendants who demonstrate a long history of
mental illness (effectively preventing young people from asserting
the defense) and raising the standard from clear and convincing to
a higher standard never before used, "evidence that produces ... a
firm belief and conviction of the truth of defendant's legal
insanity."97
The actual law passed in 1994 remains Arizona's current
insanity law. 98 It requires a defendant to establish the affirmative
defense by clear and convincing evidence, 99 and Arizona is the only
state that uses this heightened standard.100 The Statute also
states:
A person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of
the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted
with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the
person did not know the criminal act was wrong. A mental
disease or defect constituting legal insanity is an affirmative
defense. Mental disease or defect does not include disorders
that result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal
from alcohol or drugs, character defects, psychosexual
disorders or impulse control disorders. Conditions that do not
constitute legal insanity include but are not limited to
momentary, temporary conditions arising from the pressure of
the circumstances, moral decadence, depravity or passion
growing out of anger, jealousy, revenge, hatred or other
motives in a person who does not suffer from a mental disease
or defect or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal
conduct. 101
This "guilty except insane" test effectively eliminates the first
prong of the M'Naghten test. 10 2 Mark Austin's defense relied on
that first prong of M'Naghten103-not knowing the nature or
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 290.
97. Id. at 298-99.
98. See id. at 303 (describing the 1994 Arizona law).
99. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(C) (2007).
100. Melanqon, supra note 51, at 297.
101. § 13-502(A).
102. Melanqon, supra note 51, at 304.
103. Id. (noting that usually all the prosecution has to show is that the
defendant had an awareness of the probable results of his acts and that Austin's
success was an exception, as defendants usually have great difficulty proving this
[Vol. 26:203
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quality of the act.10 4 The 1994 change also limits what can be
considered a "mental disease or defect" with a formal list of
exceptions, and it identifies conditions which cannot constitute
insanity. 105
Arizona's case law provides some insight into how the state's
insanity law has evolved. In 1970, the Arizona Supreme Court
held the bifurcated trial procedure, then in place, violated due
process by giving rise to a presumption of intent in the first stage
that became an irrebuttable presumption in the second.1 0 6 That
same year, the court determined that "mental capacity to commit a
crime is a material part of total guilt for there can be no crime
without mens rea."'10 7 In 1981, in a premeditated murder case, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held it was a due process violation to
exclude relevant expert testimony that negates the mens rea
element.108 After the 1994 adoption of section 13-502, the state's
highest court affirmed a defendant's death sentence despite the
fact that the trial court had prohibited expert testimony on the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime because the
defendant had not properly preserved the issue for appeal. 109
In 1997, State v. Mott provided the Supreme Court of Arizona
with another chance to interpret the state's insanity laws. 110 The
court determined that the legislature's decision not to adopt a
diminished capacity defense "evidences its rejection of the use of
psychological testimony to challenge the mens rea element of a
crime." '11 1 Mott remains good law, although in a later unpublished
case a federal judge ordered Mott's release because she had been
denied the right to present a complete defense. 112 Despite earlier
Arizona cases suggesting that courts should allow expert
testimony as evidence to negate the mens rea element of a crime,
the Mott case now prevents such a course of action.
Arizona's insanity test"1 3 contrasts sharply with other states'
prong of the M'Naghten test).
104. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 346.
105. § 13-502(A).
106. State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 725 (Ariz. 1970).
107. State v. Daniels, 478 P.2d 522, 527 (Ariz. 1970).
108. State v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1981) ("[I]t is inconsistent
with fundamental justice to prevent a defendant from offering evidence to dispute
the charge against him. This, of course, includes any of the elements which
comprise the offense.").
109. State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 592 (Ariz. 1995).
110. State v. Mott, 931 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 1997).
111. Id. at 1050.
112. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 37.
113. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2007).
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tests, which consider a defendant's cognitive or volitional capacity,
such as the MPC test 114 and the Irresistible Impulse test."11 Both
the Arizona test and the federal test require a heightened burden
of proof.116 The Arizona test, however, also conflicts with the
federal government's test in that the federal test considers
whether the defendant can appreciate the nature or the
wrongfulness of the act. 117 Arizona's test does not consider the
cognitive capacity of the defendant. 11
II. Clark v. Arizona
On June 21, 2000, seventeen-year-old Eric Clark circled his
truck around a residential block in the small city of Flagstaff,
Arizona, blaring loud music from the speakers.119 In the eighteen
months prior, Clark transitioned from being a good student and
athlete to a jumpy, moody teenager. 120 He told his parents that
aliens had invaded their city and the water was poisoned. 12 1
Clark's strange behavior escalated-he slept with a gun,122 spoke
in gibberish, 123 took drugs, and tried to escape from a police
trooper's car after a drunk-driving arrest124-and he eventually
was committed to a psychiatric hospital until released against
medical advice. 125 Clark's mother went to a lawyer to get
information about civilly committing her son, against his will, to
another hospital just one day before the murder. 126
Clark told people he thought aliens were impersonating
government agents and trying to kill him, and only bullets could
stop them. 1 27 He also told a witness that he wanted to shoot a
114. Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 40, at 397.
115. Michalopoulos, supra note 43, at 394.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000); § 13-502(C).
117. § 13-502(C).
118. § 13-502.
119. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006).
120. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 32.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Steve Lash, Justices Urged to Clarify Rules on Mental Illness, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Apr. 19, 2006, at 1, 24.
124. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 38.
125. Lash, supra note 123, at 24.
126. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 38.
127. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona's Ability to (1)
Limit the Scope of the Insanity Defense and (2) Preclude the Use of Mental Health
Expert Testimony in Conjunction with a Mens Rea Determination, 25 DEV. MENTAL
HEALTH L. 101, 101 (2006).
[Vol. 26:203
ZERO THE SCALES
police officer after creating a disturbance as a trap. 128 As Clark
circled the block on June 21, Officer Jeffrey Moritz responded to
the noise complaints and arrived on the scene, signaling Clark to
pull over. 129  Clark obeyed.130 When Officer Moritz approached
Clark's car, Clark fired six shots and fled the scene. 131 Moritz died
shortly after. 132 Once law enforcement took Clark into custody
and charged him with first-degree murder, 133 he was found
incompetent to stand trial and was hospitalized until 2003 when a
judge found his competency restored.134 Experts for the defense
and the prosecution agreed that Clark suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia and "he was actively psychotic at the time of the
shooting."1 35 At trial, after ruling Clark could not use evidence
bearing on insanity to argue he lacked the requisite mens rea for
first degree murder,136 the court found Clark guilty.137 The trial
court determined that Clark's illness did not prevent him from
understanding his actions were wrong.' 3 8 The Court of Appeals of
Arizona affirmed the conviction and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 139
The Court considered two potential due process violations in
Clark's appeal: the state's use of an insanity test which describes
capacity only in terms of the ability to distinguish right from
wrong and its restriction of evidence of mental illness from the
mens rea element of the crime charged. 140
The Supreme Court found Arizona's narrow insanity test
caused no violation of due process.141 First, the Court considered
Clark's claim that the M'Naghten test represents the minimum
128. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 39.
129. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006).
130. Id.
131. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 38.
132. Id. at 33.
133. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716. Under the Arizona Criminal Code, a person
commits first degree murder if, "intending or knowing that the person's conduct
will cause death to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law
enforcement officer who is in the line of duty." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1105(A)(3) (2007).
134. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 38.
135. Id.
136. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2717.
137. Id. at 2718.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing 546 U.S. 1060 (2005)).
140. Id. at 2716.




mental illness defense the government must provide. 142 The Court
held "[h]istory shows no deference to M'Naghten that could elevate
its formula to the level of fundamental principle, so as to limit the
traditional recognition of a State's capacity to define crimes and
defenses."143  The Court held that although Arizona law judges
insanity only in terms of a defendant's ability to discern right from
wrong and forgoes an analysis of whether a defendant appreciated
the nature of his act, 144 cognitive capacity alone can demonstrate
moral incapacity. 145  As a result, evidence bearing on the
defendant's understanding of the nature and quality of his actions
still bears relevance in Arizona's test and is admissible. 146 The
Court also noted that the trial judge admitted Clark's evidence of
cognitive incapacity to be considered under the state's insanity
formulation and that Clark could point to no evidence related to
the insanity claim, which the trial court excluded. 147
As to Clark's second claim of a due process violation
regarding the evidence considered for the issue of mens rea, the
Supreme Court again found no violation. 148 The Court began by
breaking possible evidence into three categories: observation,
mental disease, and capacity evidence. 149 Citing the Arizona
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mott, the Court determined
that Arizona restricted only the mental disease and capacity
evidence. 150 Because the defendant had not formally objected to
the trial judge's restriction of observation evidence, the Supreme
Court considered only the mental disease and capacity evidence
issues.15 ' The Court recognized Arizona's right to define its
presumption of sanity through its definition of insanity152 and held
that to meet the demands of due process, a state must merely
show good reason for restricting these two categories of evidence in
the presentation of the insanity defense. 5 3 Arizona claimed the
restrictions served to reduce juror confusion, and the Court found
this justification for the restrictions met the "good reason"
142. Id. at 2719-20.
143. Id. at 2719.
144. Id. at 2722; see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (2007).
145. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2722.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2723.
148. Id. at 2737.
149. Id. at 2724-25.
150. Id. at 2726 (citing State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1054 (Ariz. 1997)).
151. Id. at 2727.
152. Id. at 2732-33.
153. Id. at 2733.
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standard. 15 4 The Court cited the need for "general caution" in
allowing psychological classifications to excuse criminal conduct
and the ability of mental illness evidence to lead misguided juries
into assigning expert opinions too much power. 15
Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg. 156  Kennedy argued the conviction for first-degree
murder for the intentional or knowing killing of a police officer was
improper when the trial court refused to admit evidence showing
Clark lacked the required intent. 157 Because Kennedy would have
reversed on these grounds, he did not consider the due process
violation claims. 158 At the same time, Kennedy pointed to the
constitutional guarantee that defendants have "a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."'159 The Arizona rule
acts as a ban against all evidence on the mens rea issue.160
Kennedy argued the state did not provide a valid reason for the
rule, as it must when the burden is substantial. 161 Kennedy
dismissed Arizona's proposed justifications regarding reliability
and jury confusion, ultimately determining the application of
Arizona's rule "is so plainly unreasonable that it cannot be
sustained."'162 Kennedy found the defendant was charged and
convicted of a crime he did not commit. 163
III. The Supreme Court's Interpretation Errors
A. Due Process Concerns
1. The Insanity Defense Is a Fundamental Right
Clark asked the Court to recognize the insanity defense as a
constitutional right. 164 He claimed the M'Naghten rule set a
minimum standard for the government, and Arizona's elimination
of one prong of the M'Naghten test violated a fundamental
right. 165 The Court's test for a fundamental right is "[a] principle
154. Id. at 2736.
155. Id. at 2734-35.
156. Id. at 2738.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2743 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
160. Id. at 2744-45.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2744-45, 2749.
163. Id. at 2749.
164. Id. at 2718.
165. Id. at 2719.
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of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked fundamental." 166 After considering Clark's claim, the
Court determined "[h]istory shows no deference to M'Naghten that
could elevate its formula to the level of fundamental principle, so
as to limit the traditional recognition of a State's capacity to define
crimes and defenses." 167  As support, the Court noted that the
standards for insanity vary by state, and precedent shows the
choice of a test is a matter of state policy. 168 The Court concluded:
"[D]ue process imposes no single canonical formulation of legal
insanity."169
History, however, shows the insanity defense is a
fundamental principle. 170 The defense traces its roots back
hundreds of years,171 and has been a formal, standardized part of
the law since Daniel M'Naghten's case in the 1800s. 172 Belief in
punishing the morally blameworthy is at the foundation of our
legal system, and punishing the insane does not meet this
objective. 173 According to the Supreme Court, the Due Process
Clause demands protection of principles "of the very essence of the
scheme of ordered liberty."'174 These "fundamental principles are
'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people."' 175  To
justify the identification of a fundamental principle, courts
consider its history and its acceptance within jurisdictions. 176
Although judges have given jury instructions that require moral
understanding for criminal culpability since the fifteenth century,
a principle does not need to be a formal practice to be protected by
the Due Process Clause guarantees. 177 Long before that, general
disagreement with holding the insane criminally responsible had
taken root. 178 The insanity defense's long history in English law is
enough to justify its place as a fundamental principle.
166. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2722 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952)).
169. Id.
170. Williams, supra note 26, at 235.
171. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 37 (noting the insanity defense traces its roots
back to biblical times).
172. Williams, supra note 26, at 218-19.
173. See Melangon, supra note 51, at 291.
174. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
175. Williams, supra note 26, at 234 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
176. Id.




Although the Court primarily looks to historical practice in
determining if a principle is fundamental, the Court has also
identified a second test: "unanimity of acceptance within
American jurisdictions." 179 Only four states have abolished the
insanity defense altogether-these states previously recognized
the defense. 18 0  The federal system recognizes an insanity
defense,1 81 and twenty-five states continue to use the original
M'Naghten test for insanity.18 2 Ultimately, ninety-two percent of
jurisdictions in the United States provide the insanity defense to
criminal offenders.18 3 Under the Supreme Court's two identified
tests for determining if a principle warrants protection as a
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, the long history
and wide acceptance of the insanity defense justify providing it
with this heightened level of protection.
Determining if the specific M'Naghten test for insanity
deserves the same protection presents a thornier dilemma. The
M'Naghten test contains two prongs. A defendant may be found
insane if she 1) did not know the nature or the quality of the act or
2) did not know the wrongfulness of the act.1 8 4 The first prong
refers to cognitive incapacity while the second refers to moral
incapacity. 185 In contrast, Arizona's test applies the insanity
defense only to defendants who have moral incapacity.18 6 Because
the Court has held that states have the discretion to mold their
insanity tests as they see fit,187 the Court reasoned that the
Constitution did not require Arizona to adopt the M'Naghten test
in its full form. 8 8 In addition, the Court recorded its belief that
the Arizona test had the same impact as the full M'Naghten test,
as cognitive capacity could be used to demonstrate moral
incapacity. 189
There are several reasons to question the Court's analysis on
this issue. First, while the Court has held that states have
discretion to choose their insanity test, the discussion came in the
179. Id. at 234-36.
180. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1485.
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1984).
182. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1485.
183. Williams, supra note 26, at 236.
184. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 346.
185. Id. at 346-47.
186. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2007).
187. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952) (allowing states to decide
among different versions of the insanity test).




context of a case involving the choice between the M'Naghten test
and the Irresistible Impulse test.190 The Irresistible Impulse test,
sometimes called the Irresistible Impulse exception, is used to
supplement the M'Naghten test. 191  The Court thus debated
between the M'Naghten test and the M'Naghten-plus test.192  It
did not consider the possible reduction of the M'Naghten
standards. 193 Further, most insanity tests in the United States
today either use M'Naghten as a model or broaden the insanity
standard, adopting the Durham product test or the MPC test.194
The vast majority of states using the M'Naghten test use the full
test with both prongs. 195 Virginia, New Mexico, Iowa, Mississippi,
New York, and South Carolina use the full M'Naghten test but add
additional specifications. 196 Alaska has omitted the moral prong,
but only Arizona has completely eliminated the cognitive prong. 197
These numbers offer strong evidence that cognitive capacity is a
recognized piece of the insanity defense in U.S. jurisdictions.
Because history and acceptance within American jurisdictions
support the inclusion of a cognitive prong in the insanity test as a
fundamental right, the Court erred in failing to recognize such a
test as a constitutional requirement. As the Clark case shows, the
use of a test that omits formal consideration of cognitive capacity
allows for tragic results.
2. Why the Arizona Test Violates Due Process:
Evidence of Cognitive Incapacity Ties Directly to
Mens Rea
The Arizona insanity test violates the Constitution's due
process requirements. "It is generally conceded that substantive
due process requires the presence of mens rea before criminal
punishment may be imposed for nonregulatory offenses."'19 Due
process concerns often arise when a state reduces the mens rea
requirement for insanity. 199 If a statute identifies a required mens
190. Leland, 343 U.S. at 800.
191. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 84 (1st
ed. 1994).
192. Leland, 343 U.S. at 800.
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46, 57, 67-69.
195. Deborah Giorgi-Guarnieri et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic
Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 30(2) J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S8-S9 (2002).
196. Id. at S8-S9.
197. Id. at S9.
198. Morse, supra note 79, at 805.
199. Recent Development, supra note 76, at 1137.
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rea element, it logically follows that the accused must be
permitted to present evidence to show he did not possess the
required state of mind for the crime with which he is charged. 200
Arizona's test provides a direct barrier to this type of testimony.
The evidence excluded by the trial court relates directly to
whether Clark could form the requisite mens rea for the crime for
which he was convicted. Arizona charged Clark with violating
section 13-1105(A)(3): "A person commits first degree murder if:..
• [i]ntending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause death
to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law
enforcement officer who is in the line of duty."20 1  Clark denied
having the specific intent to shoot a police officer and argued that
his paranoid schizophrenia prevented him from having the
knowledge that he was in fact shooting a police officer. 20 2
Arizona courts have broken section 13-1105(A)(3) into three
elements: intentionally or knowingly, causing the death of a police
officer, and with premeditation or in the perpetration of specific
felonies. 20 3 The contested evidence in Clark, falling under the
Court's categorization of capacity and mental illness evidence, 20 4
bears a direct relation to whether Clark knew Moritz to be a law
enforcement officer and whether Clark intended to kill a law
enforcement officer when he shot Moritz. If Clark truly believed
aliens were impersonating government agents and he could only
prevent the aliens from killing him by shooting them, then Clark
may have intended to shoot an alien when he aimed at Officer
Moritz. 20 5 The trial court should have considered all of Clark's
expert testimony evidence and its relation to Clark's ability to
form the intent required for first-degree murder. The Supreme
Court should have recognized the importance of this evidence and
struck down Arizona's restriction on it.
By restricting the expert testimony, the statute may have
created a presumption of intent. In a case challenging the state's
old bifurcated trial procedure, the Arizona Supreme Court found
that the bifurcated trial gave rise to a presumption of intent,
which ran counter to constitutional concepts of criminal law. 20 6
The same court held that "[t]o prohibit the introduction of any or
200. Gardner, supra note 8, at 690.
201. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(3) (2007).
202. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2716 (2006).
203. State v. Woods, 687 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Ariz. 1984).
204. Clark, 126 S. Ct at 2716.
205. Hafemeister, supra note 127, at 101.
206. State v. Shaw, 471 P.2d 715, 724 (Ariz. 1970).
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all the evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial of guilt or
innocence would deprive a defendant of the opportunity of
rebutting intent, premeditation, and malice, because an insane
person could have none." 207
In Sandstrom v. Montana, the United States Supreme Court
found that a jury instruction, which created a presumption of
intent, unconstitutionally shifted the burden to the defendant to
prove that he lacked the requisite mens rea. 208 Clark sought to
introduce evidence to challenge the state's assertion that he
intentionally or knowingly killed a police officer. 209 By preventing
the consideration of expert testimony on the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the crime, the court prevented Clark from
presenting a complete defense. If Clark had proved that he did not
intentionally or knowingly kill a police officer, the court could not
have convicted him of first-degree murder. By excluding the
opinion evidence, the legal system prevented Clark from rebutting
the prosecution's assertion of intent and effected a presumption of
intent, which precedent shows to be unconstitutional.
Preventing the presentation of expert testimony relevant to
mens rea might eliminate a defendant's chance to prove his
innocence and violate his constitutional right to due process.
Arizona did not provide a suitable justification for restricting the
consideration of such evidence. Clark received a life sentence 210
for intentionally or knowingly killing a police officer. 211 He had
evidence relevant to his capacity to form the intent required for
the crime, yet the legal system prevented Clark from using it, thus
Clark was denied a full opportunity for justice.
B. The Court's Offered Justification of Jury Confusion Is
Not a "Good Reason"
The Court found that due process allows for restrictions on
evidence used to rebut mens rea provided the state "has a good
reason"212 to justify the restriction. The main reason in Clark for
the Court's approval of Arizona's restriction on such evidence lies
with the jury. The Court worried that conflicting expert testimony
207. Id.
208. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 519 (1979).
209. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2733.
210. John Gibeaut, Status Quo for the Insanity Defense, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT,
June 30, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jn3Oinsane.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2007).
211. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(3) (2007).
212. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2733.
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would confuse jurors and thus found that the test met the "good
reason" standard. 213 As Justice Kennedy pointed out, however,
conflicting testimony makes the issue contested, not "irrelevant or
misleading." 214 Further, a court "[is] capable of evaluating the
competing conclusions, as factfinders do in countless cases where
there is a dispute among witnesses." 215  The possibility that
evidence would mislead the jury would only grow with the
exclusion of expert explanations regarding the defendant's
behavior and its relationship to his mental illness. 216
The potential for a misguided jury is great, but the
misperceptions of the jury usually weigh in favor of the
prosecution. Research shows that the public at large tends to
believe the insanity defense is used frequently and with great
success, that defendants acquitted by reason of insanity often
commit additional violent crimes, and that many sane defendants
successfully use the defense. 217 One expert found that the public
believes twenty to fifty percent of defendants in criminal cases
attempt to use the insanity defense. 21 8  In reality, "only one
percent of felony defendants nationwide raise the insanity
defense," and the rate of success in pleading insanity is less than
.002%.219 The insanity plea offers little incentive unless the
defendant has a very strong case because an unsuccessful attempt
to invoke insanity might be viewed as admitting to committing the
crime. 220  Despite the slim statistics, jurors operating under
common misperceptions regarding abuse of the insanity defense
might enter a courtroom believing that they have a responsibility
to protest this perceived overuse by finding a defendant guilty.221
The procedure for evaluating a defendant's sanity has a
standard formulation that demonstrates the careful consideration
behind expert testimony in these cases. First, the mental health
213. See id. at 2736 (explaining that differing expert opinions may undermine
the percieved reliability of expert opinions).
214. Id. at 2746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2746-47.
217. Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 40, at 401.
218. Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 258 (1999) (referring to one expert's study of public
opinion).
219. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1487-88.
220. Id. at 1488.
221. See, e.g., RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY & THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 144
(Transaction Publishers 1999) (1967) (referencing an experimental study in which
participants were recorded while they believed they were deliberating as a jury in a
case involving an insanity plea).
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expert should refer to the defendant's medical and psychiatric
records. 222 Second, the mental health expert should consult notes
on statements of witnesses to the defendant's behavior at the time
of the offense. 223  Such statements "are a rich source of
information regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of
the offense," offering indications of hallucinations, delusions, and
other possible mental illness symptoms. 224 Third, the expert must
interview the defendant as soon after the offense as possible. 225
Experts base their opinions on a number of factors, including
observation evidence offered by lay witnesses.226 Only an
individual trained in mental health issues possesses the necessary
skills to distinguish psychiatric symptoms based on the
defendant's own statements made during the interview. 22 7 These
trained professionals should guide the jury through interpreting a
defendant's mental illness, instead of forcing untrained jurors to
sift through complicated data they lack the training to
understand. 228 By eliminating expert testimony, the jury will miss
out on important connections between lay persons' observations of
the witness and what those observations suggest about the
impetus behind the crime committed.
Consideration of how jurors view expert testimony also
supports allowing more testimony to come into evidence. In
studies, jurors have shown an intense interest in obtaining more
information from mental health experts, including the expert's
personal opinion on the defendant's sanity at the time of the
crime. 229 At the same time, jurors have understood that they hold
the ultimate responsibility for deciding the outcome of the case,
and they did not wish to concede that power to the mental health
expert.230 This shows jurors are capable of distinguishing between
the expert's role and their own role as the trier of facts. Allowing
more expert testimony in as evidence will assist jurors in making
222. See Stephen Noffsinger & Phillip Resnick, Competency to Stand Trial and
the Insanity Defense, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 329, 340 (Liza Gold & Robert Simon eds., 2004).
223. Id. at 340-41.
224. Id. at 340.
225. Id. at 341.
226. Id. at 340-41.
227. See id. at 341 (detailing the process of the trained clinician during an
evaluative interview).
228. See Robert Lowell Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, the Insanity of Mental
Defenses and Punishment, 41 VILL. L. REV. 951, 970 (1996) (arguing that only
trained professionals should determine a defendant's mental capacity).
229. SIMON, supra note 221, at 169.
230. Id. at 89.
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an informed decision when determining the ultimate fate of the
defendant. The admission of such testimony will not prevent jurors
from reaching an independent conclusion.
In its analysis, the Clark Court noted how capacity
testimony, unlike observation testimony, consists of "judgment[s]
fraught with multiple perils," including the distinction between
legal capacity and psychological capacity. 231 The Court failed to
recognize that expert testimony could be introduced without
pushing a psychiatrist to make a concrete declaration on the
defendant's ultimate state of mind at the time of the crime.
Instead, a mental health expert might offer insight into the
disease's general impact on a defendant's thought patterns. These
insights would not force a jury determination in the defendant's
favor, but would actually provide jurors with a more complete
understanding of the defendant's disease and would better ensure
that the system punishes sane offenders while providing proper
treatment for insane offenders. The claim that expert testimony
will result in juror confusion lacks the strength to justify
restrictions on such evidence under the "good reason" test
delineated by the Court.
C. The Court's Categorizations for Evidence Are Ill-
Conceived and Will Create Juror Confusion
The Court divided evidence bearing on mens rea into three
categories: observation, mental disease and capacity evidence. 232
Observation evidence consists of lay "testimony from those who
observed what Clark did and heard what he said 23 3 and expert
testimony about the defendant's tendency to think and act in a
certain way.234 This observation evidence may support the mental
illness diagnosis. 235 Mental disease evidence forms the second
category and typically includes expert testimony by mental health
professionals who have conducted examinations of the
defendant. 236 Capacity evidence typically comes from experts who
testify about the defendant's cognitive capabilities and his ability
to form moral judgments. 237  This category, like the second,
231. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2735 (2006).
232. Id. at 2724-25.
233. Id. at 2724.
234. Id.
235. Id.




embraces opinion testimony. 238 The Supreme Court determined
that the precedent set by Mott separated observation evidence
from opinion evidence. 239 Arizona law does not restrict the use of
observation evidence, while it does prevent the use of opinion
evidence to rebut mens rea. 240
The Court's classification of types of evidence is unworkable.
Testimony from both lay and expert witnesses can fit into multiple
categories. Observations of Clark's behavior in the days leading
up to June 21, 2001 would be allowed as observation evidence, but
descriptions of that behavior by experts would fit into the opinion
evidence categories and thus be excluded. 24 1 Lay testimony on
Clark's behavior in the days prior to the murder means little
without a mental health professional's formal diagnosis of the
disease and explanation of the illness's impact. Justice Kennedy's
dissent recognized this problem. 242 Kennedy also highlighted the
hypocrisy in the majority's use of possible juror confusion as a
justification for its decision: "[Tlhe potential to mislead will be far
greater under the Court's new evidentiary system, where jurors
will receive observation evidence without the necessary
explanation from experts." 243
In a detailed study involving experimental trials and insanity
pleas, researchers recorded jury deliberations and found most of
the jurors "were irritated and frustrated by the incompleteness...
of the psychiatrist's testimony. They wanted more guidance from
the expert than the court permitted the expert to give."244
Although the Court feared the experts' potential ability to confuse
jurors, 245 most insanity trials do not involve a confusing "battle of
the experts."246 In fact, experts agreed on the diagnosis in eighty-
eight percent of insanity cases. 247 Using the classification scheme
devised by the Court can only result in inconsistent application
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2726.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 2738 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority insists
the expert description of Clark's behavior falls into the mental disease or capacity
evidence categories).
242. Id. at 2739 ("It makes little sense to divorce the observation evidence from
the explanation that makes it comprehensible.").
243. Id. at 2746-47.
244. SIMON, supra note 221, at 169.
245. Clark, 126 S. Ct at 2734.
246. Perlin, supra note 50, at 1405.
247. Id.; see also Rowe, supra note 73, at 110 ('Most psychiatric dispositions in
the criminal process are arranged without fanfare, without disagreement among
the experts, and without dissent by the prosecution.").
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and the exclusion of valuable insight regarding the impact of
mental illness on a person's thoughts and behavior.
The Court chose to exclude the most reliable evidence:
testimony by experts who have researched the issues and have
experience dealing with other people suffering from the same
illnesses. 248 Mental health doctors can determine correctly if a
defendant is faking mental illness in ninety-two to ninety-five
percent of cases. 249 Some jurisdictions use special mental health
courts consisting of a judge and attorneys with training in mental
illness as an alternative to jury trials.250 These mental health
courts generally deal with nonviolent offenders and often require a
defendant to waive his right to a jury trial to avoid violating his
Sixth Amendment right.251 Still, there is potential to expand the
role of people with special mental health expertise in determining
the appropriate punishment or treatment schedules for the
mentally 111.252 By allowing the exclusion of expert testimony, the
Court ignored the gains of science, and it allows jurors to make
uninformed decisions about insane individuals. The Court's blurry
categories of evidence will merely add to the challenge of
determining the mental health status of defendants and draw
arbitrary distinctions between inadmissible and admissible
testimony. With such results, the Court's categorizations will
likely increase juror confusion, instead of preventing it as
promised.
D. The Potential Impact of the Decision: Policy
Implications
The decision in Clark also has important policy implications
that demand consideration. First, by allowing only an extremely
narrow insanity defense, Clark will result in the criminal
conviction of more defendants with mental illnesses. 25 3 Instead of
submitting these individuals to the care of mental health
professionals, they will be sent to standard prisons like other
248. See, e.g., Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he State
seems to exclude the evidence one would think most reliable by allowing
unexplained and uncategorized tendencies to be introduced while excluding
relatively well-understood psychiatric testimony regarding well-documented
mental illnesses.").
249. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1488.
250. Id. at 1495.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1496.
253. See Melangon, supra note 51, at 306 (discussing how Arizona's narrow
insanity defense will excuse too few persons with major cognitive impairments).
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offenders. Society has long recognized one purpose of punishment
to be deterrence, yet "[t]he mentally ill offender is essentially
undeterrable since he has little, if any, moral culpability. '254 If the
mentally-ill offender has no volitional control, punishment cannot
deter him because he has no ability to choose to abstain from the
behavior. 255 Further, imprisonment of the insane offender will not
deter a sane offender because the sane offender cannot identify
with the mentally ill.256 Sentencing a mentally-ill offender to
prison would neither provide him with the optimal medical
treatment nor provide him with an effective incentive to refrain
from committing future crimes. 25 7
Containment offers another common justification for
imprisoning offenders. Through containment, individuals are
forcibly restrained from committing additional crimes.258
Mentally-ill offenders could be contained just as easily in a mental
hospital as in a state prison. 259 Rehabilitation presents another
opportunity to defend incarceration, yet most recognize that the
rehabilitation of the mentally ill can be achieved more easily
through hospitalization than imprisonment. 260
Under the final major rationale behind our system of
punishment, retribution, the sanity of a criminal offender matters
a great deal. 261 A retributivist rationale holds: "[P]unishment is
deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate society's
rules. ' ' 262 If a key objective of our criminal justice system demands
we punish only the morally blameworthy, 2 3 mentally-ill offenders
who do not know the nature or wrongfulness of their actions do not
deserve the same punishment as sane offenders who do. Moral
blameworthiness allows punishment of offenders making free,
rational, and voluntary choices, 264 but offenders like Eric Clark do
254. See Grachek, supra note 44, at 1482.
255. Id.
256. Id. Contra Nygaard, supra note 228, at 956 ("[lt would be irrelevant that
the punishment did not affect the insane offender's behavior because punishing
insane offenders would have positive consequences overall as a result of the
exemplary effects on other persons.").
257. See Gracheck, supra note 44, at 1489 (discussing the unavailability of
adequate mental health and rehabilitative treatment for the mentally ill in
prisons).
258. Nygaard, supra note 228, at 957.
259. Melangon, supra note 51, at 301.
260. Id. at 302-03.
261. Nygaard, supra note 228, at 957-58.
262. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 16.
263. Melanqon, supra note 51, at 291.
264. Gardner, supra note 8, at 665.
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not fit into this category. To demonstrate a continuing
commitment to ensure just punishment, everything possible must
be done to ensure the defendants are morally blameworthy,
including allowing the consideration of testimony by mental health
experts on the issue of mens rea.
More treatment for the mentally ill might prevent further
criminal behavior and reduce the overrepresentation of the
mentally ill within the criminal system.265 Approximately sixteen
percent of the prison population suffers from a mental illness; 266
the use of narrow insanity tests and restrictive expert testimony
rules will only serve to increase that number. The criminal justice
system should aim to channel the mentally ill into rehabilitative
treatment programs instead of "anti-therapeutic" penitentiaries. 267
Studies show "mentally ill offenders receiving prison sentences
often serve longer sentences than similarly situated sane
offenders." 268
The decision in Clark v. Arizona may have implications for
other segments of society as well. Traditionally, people with
mental retardation have been grouped with the mentally ill as
individuals who should not be held criminally liable. 269 The
American Association on Mental Retardation recognized this link
and sent an amicus brief supporting Clark's position. 270 The
lawyer who authored the amicus brief participated in an interview
with the American Bar Association shortly before the Clark
decision in which he noted the importance of the mens rea issue
for defendants with mental retardation.271 The problems created
by the holdings in Clark will harm more than just persons
suffering from mental illnesses.
Arizona's insanity statute, like those of several other
states, 272 enumerates specific illnesses not included in "mental
disease or defect." 273 This method of excluding a list of specified
265. Chris Kempner, Unfair Punishment of the Mentally Disabled? The
Constitutionality of Treating Extremely Dangerous and Mentally Ill Insanity
Acquittees in Prison Facilities, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 627 (2001).
266. Id. at 643.
267. Grachek, supra note 44, at 1489.
268. Id. (referencing findings by the Bureau of Justice).
269. Nygaard, supra note 228, at 962-63.
270. Gibeaut, supra note 19, at 36 (citing Brief for the American Psychiatric
Association et al., Supporting Petitioner, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006)
(No. 05-5966)).
271. Id.
272. Giorgi-Guarnieri, supra note 195, at S8.
273. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (2007) ('Mental disease or defect does not
include disorders that result from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal from
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disorders raises the issue of co-morbidity. 274 Diagnosis of more
than one concurrent mental illnesses, or co-morbidity, is
frequent, 275 presenting a likely dilemma when a defendant seeking
to use the insanity defense has a mental disease excluded by
section 13-502(A) and one that is not. Will the statute
automatically prevent him from asserting an insanity defense? Or
will someone be forced to make a determination on which of his
illnesses caused the behavior? If the latter is true, certainly the
decision should rest with trained experts, not the inexperienced
members of the jury. The myriad of frightening scenarios that
become possible as a result of its decision offer practical support
for challenging the way the Court chose to deal with insanity in
Clark.
Conclusion
Society has long recognized the need to include a mens rea
requirement in criminal law. Since the 1800s, American courts
have considered cognitive capacity in determining whether an
individual should be held criminally liable for his actions.
Further, although the exact formulation of the test has varied, the
insanity defense is a well-entrenched part of American criminal
law. In Clark, the Court applied faulty logic in refusing to
recognize an insanity test with a cognitive prong as a fundamental
principle essential to our scheme of ordered liberty. It thereby
denied Clark the chance to present a complete defense when it
excluded expert testimony on the issue of mens rea. The Court
attempted to justify these ill-advised findings by claiming they will
reduce jury confusion, yet the Court's decision will actually
increase jury confusion by excluding critical evidence and creating
illusory categories. The Clark decision is unconstitutional and
should be reversed before the test is used again to violate our
deepest principles of justice.
By preventing the introduction of expert testimony on the
element of mens rea, the Supreme Court suggested the practice of
alcohol or drugs, character defects, psychosexual disorders or impulse control
disorders. Conditions that do not constitute legal insanity include but are not
limited to momentary, temporary conditions arising from the pressure of the
circumstances, moral decadence, depravity or passion growing out of anger,
jealousy, revenge, hatred or other motives in a person who does not suffer from a
mental disease or defect or an abnormality that is manifested only by criminal
conduct.").
274. Melangon, supra note 51, at 309.
275. Id. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC AS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) (classifying mental disorders and
aiding psychiatrists in diagnosing mental disorders).
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psychiatry lacks sufficient legitimacy to have a proper place in our
legal system. This will serve only to perpetuate myths that
defendants abuse the insanity defense and increase the stigma
associated with those who openly acknowledge their mental
illnesses. Treatment for psychiatric disorders faces a challenging
obstacle to gain respect when the law refuses to recognize the
different degrees to which mental illness influences a person's
ability to .reason. The Clark decision means twenty-four-year-old
Eric Clark will serve a life sentence, but its impact will spread
much further than one paranoid schizophrenic. Justice demands
that the mentally ill and the mentally disabled receive different
consideration, yet Clark will be another barrier to implementing
procedures to safeguard the rights of people with special needs.

